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I. WHERE ARE EXPORT PRESSURES AND
A.

WHY

DO THEY EXIST?

East, West, North, South: Water-export projects or
proposals exist in all regions of the United
States, but naturally they are concentrated in the
Western United States. In 26 of the 52 water
resources sub-regions in the Western United States,
off-stream water use exceeds 90% of the average
monthly flow during at least one month of the
year. These may be highly urbanized areas,
southern Califronia, central Arizona or Colorado;
major agricultural areas, the Snake River Plain in
southern Idaho or the Ogallala aquifer in Kansas,
Nebraska and Texas, or mixed urban-agricultural
areas, the Great Basin and New Mexico.

B.

Gleams in Engineers Eyes: Water-export schemes
shift water from areas of surplus to areas of
shortage. Historically, water has been exported
from the area of origin intra rather than
interstate. The California State Water Plan and
the Colorado- Big Thompson transbasin diversions
are two examples of large-scale intrastate
shifts. Water users are now thinking on a larger
interstate scale as percieved shortages intensify,
and there are several pendino proposals to shift
water interstate to supply urban areas, to export
energy and to support agricultural areas that have
depleted their groundwater reserves. The following
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are examples of relatively recent proposed or
investigated interstate transfer schemes. They
range from small scale transfers to large-scale
schemes that cannot be cost-justified:
1.

Boundary Accidents. Many interstate
diversions occur because of the divergence
between political boundaries and water
demand. The case of Sporhase v. Nebraska
arose because a Nebraska farmer wanted to use
water withdrawn from a well on the Nebraska
side of his farm on the Colorado side. The
City of El Paso Texas' application to perfect
groundwater rights to 296,000 acre feet in New
Mexico for the purpose of exporting the water
to El Paso is a classic example of a smallscale interstate diversion. There are many
other such examples of either existing or
potential diversions.

2.

Keeping Houston Cool. The Clean Air Act and
the now defunct energy crisis of the 1970s
stimulated interest in transporting low sulfur
western coal to centers of high demand for
electricity in the midwest, southeast and
Texas. Slurry pipelines, through which coal
is pumped suspended in water, could reduce the
major barrier to the increase use of western
coal, transportation costs. For example, the

proposed ETSI pipeline would carry coal as far
as 1,400 miles from Wyoming to Texas and
Louisiana. Wyoming water user objections to
the acquisition of Wyoming water rights for
the project forced ETSI to attempt a double
trans-watershed diversion for the pipeline.
Legislation was passed in South Dakota

which

would allow the South Dakota Conservancy
District to apply to the Water Management
Board for a permit to appropriate Missouri
River water stored behind the Oahe Reservoir
and in turn to transfer the permit to ETSI.
1982 South Dakota Session Laws, ch. 1, pp. 410.
3.

Ogallala Bailout. The Six-State High PlainsOgallala Six-State Regional Resources Study
investigated four plans to import water from
the Missouri or rivers in eastern Arkansas and
Texas. The cost, exclusive of costs beyond
the terminal reservoir, would be between $226
to $434 per acre foot, and the environmental
impact of these interbasin transfers would be
substantial. Office of Technology Assessment,
Water-Related Technologies for Sustainable
Agriculture in U.S. Arid/Semiarid Lands 188191 (1983).
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4.

California Lifestyle Threatened. San Diego
purchases most of its water from the
Metropolitan water District of Los Angeles.
This water is imported from the Colorado
River, and much of the water that MET has been
selling to San Diego and others is water
allocated to Arizona by the decree in Arizona
v. California. San Die g o County will be the
biggest loser when the Central Arizona Project
is fully operational. The County estimates
that by 2000 in dry years its 1.5 million acre
foot system could be short by one-half. A
consortium of Colorado developers is proposing
to purchase Colorado senior irrigation water
rights, to store the water behind dams in
nothern Colorado and to ship it down the
mainstem of the Colorado to purchasers in
California and Arizona. The New York Times,
February 24, 1985, p. 4E, col. 3 and Western
States Water News, Issue No. 568, April 5,
1985.

5.

The Slide Rule's The Limit. The arid west has
always thought big when it comes to water, and
consideration has been given to the tapping
the Columbia basin and even the Great Lakes.
A proposed plan to pipe water from Lake
Superior to Gilette, Wyoming and to pipe it

back to the Midwest as coal slurry was
abandoned when Congress failed to pass
legislation granting slurry pipelines the
power of eminent domain. See Final Report and
Recommendations: Great Lakes Governors Task
Force on Water Diversion and Great Lakes
Institutions 4 (1985).
C. Is Water Just Another Resource? States seldom try
and restrict the place of use of coal, oil and gas
and other natural resources extracted in the
state. Early Supreme Court decisions holding that
export prohibitions violated the negative commerce
clause, e.g. west v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221
U.S. 229 (1911) and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923), because oil and gas were
commodities in interstate commerce, shifted state
efforts to confine the benefits of geological
accident within the state to severance taxes.
Historically, water resources have not been viewed
by western states as mere commodities to be
developed and sold to the highest bidder. Water
resources have been seen as a special class of
natural resources dedicated to the preservation of
historic economies and thus exempt from normal
economic laws:
Whatever the development of water
supply is estimated to cost,
Westerners tend to think it is worth
the price. The believe that if
6

water becomes too expensive,
everything else will become yet more
dear, and were they to lack a
sufficient supply of this basic
ingredient (water), they would be
unable to reap the profits that come
with enterprise and development. In
short, water is conceived by
Westerners as a coveted commodity, a
worthy prize for which they are
willing to eng a g e in demanding
political games, where pay-offs may
come only far into the future.
[Martin, Ingram & Laney, A
willingness to Play, An Analysis of
Water Resources Development, 7
Western Economics Journal 137
(1982).]
This attitude is now being challenged by a
coalition of neo-conservative resource economists
and environmentalists who argue that water should
be allocated through national private markets
rather than through the state and national
political and administrative process. e.g., Cuzan,
Appropriators Versus Expropriations: The Political
Economy of Water in the West, in Water Rights:
Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the
Environment ) (T. Anderson ed. 1983).

II. ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS IN INTERSTATE STREAMS AND
BARRIERS TO SUCH ACQUISITION
A. Types of Interstate Claims. Rights in interstate
streams are generally claimed by the following
methods:
1.

A private user appropriates water in State A.
for use in State A., but claims a priority
against users in State B.
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2.

A private user appropriates or otherwise
perfects a right under the laws of State A.
for use in State B.

3.

State A. asserts its police power by bringing
an equitable apportionment action in the
Supreme Court to claim a portion of an
interstate stream for the benefit of its
citizens to the detriment of State B.'s
citizens.

4.

State A. agrees to sell water that it claims
that it "owns" to private parties for use in
State B.

5.

States A. and B. enter into an interstate
compact to allocate an interstate stream
between them.

6.

Congress exercise its commerce power to
allocate a stream between states A. and B.

B. Me First. States have a variety of means to resist
exports. In addition on to the lecislation
discussed in IV., some states have area of origin
protection legislation that poses a barrier to the
use of water in and out of state. See Final Report
to the President ane Congress of the United States
by the National Water Commission, Water Policies
For the Future 317-333 (1973). The entire permit
approval process can be used to protect in-state
users.

1.

Public trust considerations may be cited by
states to boulster in-state protection
decisions. e. g . National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court, 33 Ca1.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).

2.

In-stream flow protection strategies have also
been urged an effective method for a state to
embargo water. e.g., In Re Permit #21-7282 To
Establish Minimum Stream Flows on Henry's Fork
In The Name of Idaho Water Resources Board,
Western Natural Resources Litigation Digest
12.16, April, 1985.

III. PRIVATE INTERSTATE RIGHTS
A. Ex port The Early Norm. The doctrine of prior
appropriation allows water tc be used without
regard to the locus of the place of diversion or
withdrawal. The early cases thus assumed that
priorities should be enforced across state lines.
See generally 1 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in
the Nineteen Western States pp. 389-396 (1971) for
a summary of the law state by state. The issue
generally arises because a downstream user in State
A. seeks to protect a State A. priority against
junior priorities in upstream State B. Interstate
priorities should logically not exist because:
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1.

State appopriation statutes, absent a
reciprocity provision, have no
extraterritorial application. Willey V.
Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210 (1903).

2.

Courts have viewed themselves without
jurisdiction to adjudicate water rights of out
of state users, but this lack of jurisdiction
has been questioned. Corker, Water Rights in
Interstate Streams S131.3(8), in Waters and
Water Rights (R.E. Clark ed. 1967).
Interstate Priorities Enforced. Priorities in

B.

interstate streams have been protected against
out of state juniors under three different
rationales:
1.

The Act of 1866 created private appropriative
water rights on the public domain enforceable
against all juniors. Howell v. Johnson, 89
Fed. 556 (C.C.D. Mont. 1898).

2.

By judicial fiat the relative rights of
appropriators are the same regardless of the
situs of the appropriations. Willey v.
Decker, supra.
a.

Relief is in personam not in rem. 1 Wiel,
Water Rights in the Western States S344
(3ed. 1911).

b.

A court must have jurisdiction over the
parties and thus interstate rights are
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usually enforced only if the State A.
claimant sues in State B.
3.

State B. must a honor State A. priority. The
mutual adoption of the same system of water
law creates reciprocal interstate rights
because each state e qually benefits from the
rule. Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 1911).

IV. EXPORT RESTRICTIONS.
In addition to the usual problems of acquiting an
appropriative right, proof of unappropriated water and
protection of vested rights, State A. may impose
statutory restrictions on the export of water to state
B.
A. Export Prohibitions. Prior to Sporhase v. Nebraska
458 U.S. 741 (1982), many states had flat
prohibitions on applications to divert water out of
state. See Clyde, State Prohibitions on the
Interstate Exportation of Scarce Water Resources 53
University of Colorado Law Review 529 (1982).
These prohibitions are presumptively
unconstitutional, but they still can be found in
state statutes. e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes
1973 S37- 81- 101, repealed; Montana Code Annotated
S85-1-121, repealed 1983, Laws of Montana, Cptr.
706, H.B. 908; and Nevada Revised Statutes S533.520
(post-March 23, 1951 diversions)
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B. Moritoria. In response to El Paso's proposed
appropriation for use in Texas, New Mexico imposed
a two year moritorium starting on March 6, 1984 on
appropriations in all aquifers hyrologically
related to the Rio Grande River below Elephant
Butte dam. New Mexico Statutes 1978 S72-12-3.1
(1984 Supp.).
C. Allowance of Interstate Appropriations.
1.

Appropriations for a beneficial use in a
specific state or city may be allowed. Idaho
Code S42- 401 (use in Oregon); Idaho Code §42411 (appropriation for the City of Pullman,
Washington authorized)

2.

Appropriations for a beneficial use in another
state may be allowed if the host state has
reciprocal export privileges. Idaho Code §42409 (use in Wyoming); Nevada Revised Statutes
S533.522 (interstate streams);

D. Allowance of Interstate appropriations for Specific
Pro'ects. Wyoming authorized the construction of
two specific coal slurry pipeline subject to
detailed conditions. Wyoming Statues Ann. §41-2301 and S41.3-111 (1984 Cumulative Supp.).
E. X-ing Out the Facial Discrimination Most states
have responsed to Sporhase v. Nebraska by statutes
that allow interstate transfers subject to
restrictive conditions:
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1.

Colorado Revised Statutes 637-82- 101 (1984
Cumulative Supp.):
(3) Prior to approving an application, the
state engineer, ground water commission, or
water judge, as the case may be, must find
that:
(a) The proposed use of water outside this
state is expressly authorized by interstate
compact or credited as a delivery to another
state pursuant to section 37-81-103 or that
the proposed use of water does not impair the
ability of this state to comply with its
obligations under any judicial decree or
interstate compact which apportions water
between this state and any other state or
states:
(b) The proposed use of water is not
inconsistent with the reasonable conservation
of the water resources of this state; and
(c) The proposed use of water will not
deprive the citizens of this state of the
beneficial use of waters apportioned to
Colorado by interstate compact or judicial
decree.
(4) Any diversion of water from this state
which is not in compliance with this section
shall not be recognized as a beneficial use
for purposes of perfecting a water right to
the extent of such unlawful diversion or use.

2.

Kansas Statutes Annotated $82a- 726 (1984)
allows interstate appropriations subject to
conditions imposed by the chief engineer
"including an express condition that should
any such water be necessary to protect the
health and safety of the citizens of this
state, such approved application may be
suspended, modified or revoked by the chief
engineer for such necessity."

3.

New Mexico Statutes 1978 §72-128-1 (1984
Supp.) allows appropriations for use in
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another state subject to the following
standards:
C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

In order to approve an application under
this act, the state engineer must find
that the applicant's withdrawal and
transportation of water for use outside
the state would not impair existing water
rights, is not contrary to the
conservation of water within the state
and is not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare of the citizens of New
Mexico.
In acting upon an application under this
act, the state engineer shall consider,
but not be limited to, the following
factors:
(1) the supply of water available to the
state of New Mexico;
(2) water demands of the state of New
Mexico;
(3) whether there are water shortages
within the state of New Mexico;
(4) whether the water that is the
subject of the application could
feasibly be transported to alleviate
water shortages in the state of New
Mexico;
(5) the supply and sources of water
available to the applicant in the
state where the applicant intends to
use the water; and
(6) the demands placed on the
applicant's supply in the state
where the applicant intends to use
the water.
By filing an application to withdraw and
transport waters for use outside the
state, the applicant shall submit to and
comply with the laws of the state of New
Mexico governing the appropriation and
use of water.
The state engineer is empowered to
condition the permit to insure that the
use of water in another state is subject
to the same regulations and restrictions
that may be imposed upon water use in the
state of New Mexico.
Upon approval of the application, the
applicant shall designate an agent in New
Mexico for reception of service of
process and other legal notices.
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4.

Nebraska Revised Statutes Reissue 1984 §46613.01:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal
corporation, or any other entity intending to
withdraw ground water from any well or pit
located in the State of Nebraska and transport
it for use in another state shall apply to the
Department of Water Resources for a permit to
do so. In determining whether to grant such
permit, the Director of Water Resources shall
consider:
(1) Whether the proposed use is a beneficial
use of ground water;
(2) The availability to the applicant of
alternative sources of surface or ground
water;
(3) Any negative effect of the proposed
withdrawal on surface or ground water
supplies needed to meet reasonable future
demands for water in the area of the
proposed withdrawal; and
(4) Any other factors consistent with the
purposes of this section that the
director deems relevant to protect the
interests of the state and its citizens.
Issuance of a permit shall be conditioned on
the applicant's compliance with the rules and
regulations of the natural resources district
from which the water is to be withdrawn. The
applicant shall be required to provide access
to his or her property at reasonable times for
purposes of inspection by officials of the
local natural resources district or the
Department of Water Resources.

5.

Wyoming requires legislative review of coal
slurry appropriation applications. Wyo.
Statutes Ann. S41-3-115 (1984 Cumulative Supp)
requires that the legislature consider:
The amount of water proposed to be
(i)
appropriated and the proposed uses;
The amount of water available for
ii)
appropriation from the proposed source, and
the natural characteristics of the source;
(iii) The economic, social, environmental and
other benefits to be derived by the state from
the proposed appropriation;
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(iv)
The benefits to the state by the use of
the water within the state that will be
foregone by the proposed appropriation;
The benefits presently and
(v)
prospectively derived from the return flow of
water in intrastate use which will be
eliminated by the proposed out-of-state use;
The injury of existing water rights of
(vi)
other appropriators that may result from the
proposed use;
(vii) Whether the use formulated and carried
out promotes or enhances the purposes and
policies of the state's water development
plans and water resources policy, and that the
use will not unreasonably interfere with other
planned uses or developments for which a
permit has been or may be issued;
(viii) Whether the proposed use will
significantly impair the states interest and
ability to preserve and conserve sufficient
quantities of water for reasonably foreseeable
consumptive uses and other beneficial uses
recognized by law to include but not limited
to domestic, livestock, agricultural,
municipal and industrial purposes;
Whether the proposed use will adversely
(ix)
affect the quantity or quality of water
available for domestic or municipal use;
(x)
Whether, to the greatest extent
possible, the correlation between surface
water and groundwater has been determined, to
avoid possible harmful effects of the proposed
use on the supply of either.

V. NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON STATE EXPORT
BANS
A. The Negative Commerce and The "Ownership" Immunity.
State laws that interfere with interstate commerce
are subject to judicial scrutiny. Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851). However, the
Supreme Court held in 1896 that resources owned in
"trust" by a state were immune from the negative
commerce clause. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
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(1896) (wild game). Geer's result, but not
reasoning, was applied to water by Justice
Holmes. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349 (1908) upheld a water export prohibition.
B.

Bad Precedent. The logic of Geer and McCarter was
flawed from the start. It was never applied to oil
and gas. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S.
229 (1911). The ownership in trust theory is
simply an assertion of the state's police power and
exercises of the police power are subject to the
commerce clause. Geer was overruled in Hughes v.
Okalhoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). See generally
Tarlock, So Its Not "Ours" Why Can't We Still Keep
It? A First Look At Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 Land
& Water Law Review 182 (1983) and Hellerstein,
Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause
and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979
Supreme Court Review 51.

C.

Hudson County Falls. Negative Commerce clause
scrutiny was extended to state water law in
Sphorhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) The
Court held that the a Nebraska statute that
prohibited the export of water unless the host
state granted reciprocal privileges violated the
negative commerce clause.
1.

Facts. Sporhase owned a tract of land that
straddled the border between Colorado and
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Nebraska and wanted to pump from a Nebraska
well to supply the Colorado portion. He
failed to comply with a Nebraska statute that
required him to apply for a permit to transfer
groundwater out of Nebraska. The Nebraska
statute provided that a permit would be
granted to an applicant if the Director of
Water Resources found that the groundwater
withdrawal was "reasonable" . . . . not
contrary to the conservation and use of ground
water, and . . . . not otherwise detrimental
to the public welfare" and that the host state
allowed the transport of its groundwater to
Nebraska. Because Colorado lacked such a
reciprocity agreement, it was unlikely that
appellants would have received a permit.
2.

Result and "Reasoning". The Court reversed
the Nebraska supreme court's decision to
uphold the state's right to enjoin the
transfered groundwater to Colorado and held
that groundwater is an article of commerce.
Because Nebraska's reciprocity clause was an
explicit barrier to interstate commerce, it
must be "narrowly tailored" to the state's
purported interest in conservation. The
statute was unconstitutional because the fit
between the statute and Nebraska's
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conservation objectives was not "close"
enough.

D. What Does

Sporhase Mean? Sporhase implicates both

facially and non-facially discriminatory
legislation.
1.

Facially Discrimination Legislation. It is
unlikely that a straight export prohibition
can be sustained under Sporhause. Most state
legislatures so assume.

2.

Non-Facially Discriminatory Legislation. Nonfacially discriminatory legislation will be
tested by the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 237, 142 (1970): "Where the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its
effect on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities." It
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has been suggested that Sporhase applies to
non-facially discriminatory groundwater
management conservation programs such as the
Arizona Groundwater Management Act, Arizona
Revised Statutes Annotated SS45-401-637.
Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutionality of Intrastate Groundwater
Management Programs, 62 Texas Law Review 537
(1983).

VI. POST-SPORHASE EXPORT BANS
A. Is Water Still Unique? At various times the Court
has suggested that health and safety regulations
are entitled to greater deference compared to crass
protectionist legislation, although the Court has
collapsed this distinction when they have not
accepted the state's health or resource
conservation justification. City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 47 (1978) and Raymond Motor
Transportation Co. v. Rue, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
However, Justice Stevens went out of his way in
Sporhase to suggest that water laws may stand of a
different footing because of the unique role of
water. The following language in Sporhase has been
studied like the Talmud: "If it could be shown
that the state as a whole suffers a water shortage,
that the intrastate transportation of water from
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areas of abundance to areas of shortage is feasible
regardless of distance, and that the importation of
water from adjoining states would roughly
compensate for any exportation to those states,
then the conservation and preservation might be
credibly advanced for the reciprocity provision. A
demonstrably arid state conceivably might be able
to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end
relationship between even a total ban on the
exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and
preserve water."
B. End Runs Around Sporhase The following
justifications for export prohibition have been
suggested:
1.

Hydrologic imperatives such as the
interconnection between surface and
groundwater resources dictate that water be
treated differently from commodity resources,
and thus the usual promotion-of-a- nationalcommon-market rationale for judicial
invalidation of state parochialism, e.g.,
H.P.Hood v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), does
not apply. See Tarlock, National Power, State
Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the
1980's; Scaling America's Magic Mountain, 32
Kansas L. Rev. 111, 133-135 (1983) and Corker,
Sporhase v. Nebraska Ex Rel. Douglas: Does
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the Dormant Commerce Clause Really Limit the
Power of A State To Forbid (1) The Export of
Water and (2) The Creation of Water Right In
Another State, 54 University of Colorado Law
Review 393, 402-414 (1983).
a.

New Mexico unsuccessfully attempted an
arid lands defense to justify its refusal
to allow El Paso to acquire state
groundwater rights for export. City of
El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F.Supp. 379
(D.N.M. 1983). New Mexico argued that
the state would have a shortage of at
least 626,000 acre feet by 2020, but the
court held that "outside of fulfilling
human survival needs, water is an
economic resource." The decision was
vacated and remanded by the Tenth Circuit
in light of N.M. Stat. §72-12B-1, supra,
F.2d (10th Cir. 1983). Judge Bratton
subsequently ruled that most portions of
the statute are constitutional and the
administrative hearing on El Paso's
application was set to begin on May 15,
1985. Western Natural Resources
Litigation Digest 12.15, April, 1985.

b.

City of El Paso suggested that a state
could overcome the claim that export
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prohibitions discriminate against
interstate commerce if they have a
sophisticated water allocation plan and
intrastate transfers are part of that
plan. New Mexico had no such firm plans,
but the decision has forced the state to
begin to face some hard choices about
water use. See The Impact of Recent
Court Decisions Concerning Water and
Interstate Commerce on Water Resources of
the State of New Mexico (A Report to
Governor Tony Anaya and the Legislative
Council by the Water Law Study
Committee), 24 Natural Resources Journal
688 (1984).
2.

Congress can consent to unconstitutional state
laws where the constitutional restrictions
bind the states but not the federal
government. Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1947) and New England
Power v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
a.

Congressional intent must be express, but
no other limitations have been recognized
by the Court. Cohen, Constitutional
Power to Validate Unconstitutional State
Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old
Enigma, 35 Stanford Law Review 387
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(1983), argues that the only limitations
on federal power are federal
constitutional guarantees of individual
liberty and due process. This limitation
might prohibit Congress from enacting
water use legislation that discriminates
on the basis of state citizenship because
the equal protection clause limits
Congress as well as the states. See
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436
U.S. 371, 394-406 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
b.

Prudential has been applied to export
prohibitions contained in congressionally
approved interstate water compacts.
Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River
Compact Comm., 590 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mont.
1983), U.S. Supreme Court appeal
denied,

U.S.

(1984), appeal pending

9th Circuit Court of Appeals, upheld
Article X of the Yellowstone River
Compact which requires the approval of
all three signatory states for an
interbasin diversion because
Congressional approval of a compact "may
be considered the express statement of
intent to immunize the compact" from
negative commerce clause scrutiny:
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Furthermore, the
Constitution requires
congressional consent to
an interstate compact only
when the compact threatens
to encroach upon the
supremacy of the United
States. A threat to the
supremacy of the United
States necessarily entails
a threat to one of
Congress's enumerated
legislative powers since
those powers are the
source of supreme federal
authority. Thus, when it
approves a compact,
Congress exercises the
legislative power that the
compact threatens to
encroach upon, and
declares that the compact
is consistent with
Congress's supreme power
in that area. See Cuyler
v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,
101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d
641 (1981). In the
present case, therefore to
the extent that the
Compact interferes with
interstate commerce,
Congress has exercised its
commerce power in
approving the Compact.
3.

State resources owned and marketd by the state
are not subject to the negative commerce
clause. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980). Reeves was cited in Sporhase after
the following "analysis" of Nebraska's claim
that the state's groundwater was owned in
trust for the public. The natural resource
has some indicia of a good publically produced
and owned in which a state may favor its own
citizens in times of shortage."
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a.

South Dakota read Reeves and Sporhase
broadly and enacted legislation that
allows the state to sell stored Missouri
River water for export, 1982 S.D. Sess.
Laws, ch. 1, p. 4-10.

b.

The South Dakota Water Management Board
subsequently issued a permit, No. 1791-2,
and South Dakota landowners challenged
the Board's decision for lack of
procedural due process and for its
failure to file an environmental impact
statement. In the Matter of the Decision
of the State of South Dakota Water
Management Board Approving Water Permit
No. 1791-2, 351 N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1984),
held that landowners along the proposed
pipeline route were not entitled to
actual notice by letter because the water
board hearing did not determine the
pipeline route and thus "individual
landowners within the state . . . had no
greater interest in the matter than any
other citizen of South Dakota. . . ."
Landowners whose land would be condemned
would be entitled to full due process.
The court also held that the published
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notice gave citizens a fair opportunity
to participate in the hearing and that an
EIS was optional. Justice Henderson
dissenting argued that minimum compliance
with South Dakota statutes governing
publication notice and a right to
challenge exercises of the power of
eminent domain was not adequate due
process in light of the magnitude of the
issues:
The state of South
Dakota does not own the
water in the State of
South Dakota. Neither
does ETSI. Indeed, the
sovereign and this private
corporation contracted
between themselves
concerning the people's
water. SDCL 46-1-3
expresses that "all water
within the state is the
property of the people of
the state. . . ." This
justice hazards that this
sweeping policy
declaration is binding
upon the people of this
state concerning certain
water in this state. What
say the legal scholars or
judges of this nation
concerning the impounded
water created by the great
dams built across the
mighty Missouri River in
South Dakota? The
downstream states--what
are their rights to these
impoundments? These
questions will be answered
in due time but are now
blowing in the wind.
Perhaps the flame of
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wisdom will open the
horizons of legal minds so
that this water will one
day nourish the dry plain
that it might be
fruited. This I know:
Several downstream states,
including our sister
stateof Nebraska, have
filed a federal lawsuit to
stop the sale. In early
May 1984, United States
District Judge Warren
Urbom of Lincoln,
Nebraska, issued an
injunction blocking the
sale of these impounded
waters from South Dakota
to ETSI. Therefore, the
very subject of this
appeal is now, in a sense,
being litigated in federal
courts. [351 N.W.2d at
126-127.]
Justice Henderson also noted that ETSI's
and South Dakota's argument that western
state communities would get a source of
high quality water supply was a surprise
issue on which opponents were illprepared.
c.

Missouri v. Andrews,

F.Supp.

(D.

Neb. 1982) challenged the federal
government's authority to issue the
necessary permits for the pipeline and to
enter into a contract for a 20,000 acre
foot transbasin diversion. The district
court held that the Secretary of the
Interior was without authority to enter
into the contract, and the case was
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appealed to the 8th Circuit. ETSI
abandoned the project in August of 1984,
and the issue is now mootness. Western
Natural Resources Liigation Digest 12.21,
April, 1905.

VI. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
A.

Judicial Export. Exquitable apportionment is a
Supreme Court doctrine that defines the amount of
water to which riparian states on interestate
streams are entitled, and thus may both mandate
"exports" by upstream states and limit the amount
of water that an upstream state may export.
Apportionments are made on the basis of federal
common law. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907). See 2 Waters and Water Rights S132.1.

B.

Staying in Court. A riparian state may bring an
original action in the Supreme Court, but there are
two primary barriers to an adjudication on the
merits:
1.

Parens Patriae. A state must sue to advance a
general state water allocation interest rather
than merely to vindicate a limited classes of
users injured by a diversion. North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 262 U.S. 361 (1923).

2.

High Burden of Proof of Injury. Although the
Court has been somewhat inconsistent, the
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general rule is that the injured state must
demonstrate a high decree of probable harm
from another state's use of water. Missouri
v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). The Court
has held this burden satisfied on overappropriated streams by an allegation that
existing or proposed diversions will deprive a
state of necessary water in dry years.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
C.

Dividing the Waters. Initially the Court seemed to
adopt a simple guideline for equitble
apportionments. Riparian principles for riparian
states, New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
(1936), and enforcement of priorities between prior
appropriation states. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922). However, the Court never adhered
strictly to common law rules or to the law of prior
appropriation, and the Court has now adopted a
multi-factor balancing test that permits deviations
from state law for "equitable" reasons. Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).

D.

Using Equitable Apportionment To Keep It.
1.

Sporhase Pervades A state may use equitable
apportionment claims either in original
jurisdiction suits or compact controversies,
e.g. Texas v. New Mexico,

U.S.

(1982),

but in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon,
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U.S.

(1983) the Court for the first time

linked the equitable appotionment doctrine
with the negative commerce clause:
At the root of the
doctrine is the same principle
that animates many of the
Court's Commerce Clause
cases: a State may not
preserve solely for its own
inhabitants natural resources
located within its horders.
See Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
S87 U.S. 617, 627, 98 S.Ct.
2531, 2537 57 L.Ed.2d 475
(1978); see also New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455
U.S. 331, 838, 102 S.Ct. 1096,
1100, 71 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982),
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at
880, 99 S. Ct. at 1789.
Consistent with this principle,
States have an affirmative duty
under the doctrine of equitable
apportionment to take
reasonable steps to conserve
and even to augment the natural
resources within their borders
for the benefit of other
States. Colorado v. New
, 108
Mexico,
U.S. at
S.Ct. at 546; Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484, 42
S.Ct. 552, 564, 66 L.Ed. 999
(1922).
2.

Conservation and Planning Are All? The
Supreme Court has suggested that equitable
apportionment allows a junior diversion to
displace a senior diversion if the method of
exercise in inefficient. See generally
Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment
Revisited. Updated and Restated, 56
University of Colorado Law Review
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(1985

forthcoming). Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176 (1982). The Court subsequently held
that the senior diversion would be protected
against a proposed new diversion because the
diverting state must justify its diversion by
clear and convincing evidence:

Requiring Colorado to
present clear and convincing
evidence in support of the
proposed diversion is necessary
to appropriately balance the
unique interests involved in
water rights disputes between
sovereigns. The standard
reflects this Court's long-held
view that a proposed diverter
should bear most, though not
all, of the risks of erroneous
decision: "The harm that may
result from disrupting
established uses is typically
certain and immediate, whereas
the potential benefits from a
proposed diversion may be
speculative and remote."
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S., at 187, 103 S.Ct. at 547;
see also id. at 182, n 9, 103
S.Ct.., at 544, n. 9.
In
addition, the clear-and
convincing-evidence standard
accommodates society's
competing interests in
increasing the stability of
property rights and in putting
resources to their most
efficient uses: "[T]he rule of
priority [will] not be strictly
applied where it 'would work
more hardship' on the junior
user 'than it sould bestow
benefits' on the senior use [r,
. . . though] the equities
supporting the protection of
existing economies will usually
be compelling." Id., at 186,
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103 S.Ct. at 547 (quoting
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589, 619, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 1351,
89 L.Ed. 1815 (1945). In
short, Colorado's diversion
should and will be allowed only
if actual inefficiencies in
present uses or future benefits
from other uses are highly
probable.
a.

The diverting state must identify
financially an physically feasible
conservation measure.

b.

The diverting state must itself take
steps to minimize the need for the
diversion, and this may include planning
duties:

Again, we find ourselves
without adequate evidence to
approve Colorado's proposed
diversion. Colorado has not
committed itself to any longterm use for which future
benefits can be studied and
predicted. Nor has Colorado
specified how long the interim
agricultural use might or might
not last. All Colorado has
established is that a steel
corporation wants to take water
for some unidentified use in
the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
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